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This opinion, though lacking in substantial authority, reaches an equitable result. For a transferee to acquire the status of a holder in due course,
it is essential that each individual order instrument be clearly indorsed by
the transferor. Denying River Oaks Bank the status of a holder in due
course was justified because River Oaks never availed itself of its absolute
right to have Lewis separately indorse each note in the series. The insistence upon a separate indorsement written on or attached to each promissory note will eliminate at least some of the confusion anticipated by the
Estrada court and will not be an onerous requirement. Promissory notes,
unlike checks, are not generally passed in such great volume that careless
acceptance of improperly indorsed instruments should be allowed.
Laurence A. Canter

COMMUNITY PROPERTY-Division of Property on DivorceSpouse Cannot Be Divested of Title to Separate Real
Property Under Texas Family Code § 3.63
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer,
554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
Virginia Eggemeyer obtained a divorce from her husband, Homer Eggemeyer, and was named managing conservator of their four minor children.
During marriage the couple owned a small farm, one-third of which was
the husband's separate property with the remaining two-thirds belonging
to the community estate. The divorce decree granted the wife title to the
farm subject to a $10,000.00 lien in favor of the husband, to be paid by her
when the youngest child reached majority. The husband appealed, alleging
that the divestiture of his separate title to real property was clearly an
abuse of discretion.' The Austin Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the decision in part, holding that section 3.63 of the Texas Family
Code does not authorize divestiture of a spouse's separate interest in real
estate.' On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the wife contended that
divestiture may be ordered under section 3.63 if the division would be "just
and right." Held-Affirmed. The divestiture of one spouse's separate
realty and the transfer of title to the other spouse is not authorized by
section 3.63 of the Texas Family Code; it is, however, within the discretion
of the trial court upon divorce to set aside the rents, revenues, and income
from a spouse's separate property for the support of minor children.'
1. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976), affd,
554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
2. Id. at 428.
3. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977).
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Since 1841 the primary Texas statutory provision concerning property
settlement has required a "just and right" division of the estate of the
parties.4 This language has been interpreted consistently to allow the divorce courts broad discretion in dividing the spouses' property. ' The
court's discretion, however, was limited by a provision in the Divorce Act
of 1841 which prohibited the divestiture of title to real estate.' The same
restriction was embodied in each subsequent act prior to the present Family Code provision.7 The failure of the statute to specify whether the limitation applied only to separate real property, or to community property as
well, created a divergence of case law' which resulted in confusion lasting
until the issue was finally settled in 1960 by the Texas Supreme Court in
Hailey v. Hailey.9 Prior to Hailey, the prohibition against divestiture was
interpreted by some courts to include both separate and community real
property;'" other courts applied the prohibition only to separate real property owned by the spouses." Hailey limited the divestiture proviso to separate real property and thereby settled, for the time being, the controversy
surrounding the ill-prepared legislation."
Shortly after the passage of the 1841 Act, the Texas Supreme Court
established a means of circumventing the issue of divestiture while still
4. See TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4638 (1925); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4634 (1911); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2980 (1895); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
art. 2864 (1879); Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974); Gulley v. Gulley, 111 Tex. 233,
238, 231 S.W. 97, 98 (1921); Simons v. Simons, 23 Tex. 344, 348 (1859); Daniels v. Daniels,
490 S.W.2d 862, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ dism'd); White v. White, 380
S.W.2d 672, 677-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barry v. Barry, 162 S.W.2d
440, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942, no writ).
6. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS

484 (1898).

7. Compare TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975) with statutes cited note 4 supra.
8. See, e.g., Tiemann v. Tiemann, 34 Tex. 523, 525 (1871) (community property could
not be divested); Mansfield v. Mansfield, 308 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1957,
writ dism'd) (division of community lots held proper); Swanson v. Swanson, 229 S.W.2d 843,
847-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, no writ) (error to award entire community lot to one
spouse). See generally Comment, Hailey, Hilley and House Bill 670-A Study in Partition
and Survivorship in Texas Community Property, 15 Sw. L.J. 613, 614 (1961).
9. 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960).
10. See Tiemann v. Tiemann, 34 Tex. 523, 525 (1871); Maisel v. Maisel, 312 S.W.2d 679,
684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ); Donias v. Quintero, 227 S.W.2d 252, 255-56
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, no writ); Puckett v. Puckett, 205 S.W.2d 124, 125-26 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1947, no writ).
11. See Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 473, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); Fitts v. Fitts,
14 Tex. 443, 454 (1855); Mansfield v. Mansfield, 308 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1957, writ dism'd); Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950,
no writ).
12. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960).
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allowing a "just and right" division of property.'" In Fitts v. Fitts" the
husband gave his real property in trust for the benefit of his wife and
children. As a result, he was left with little or nothing in the community
estate. When his wife later divorced him, he was unable to support himself
and was faced with utter destitution. The court departed from the usual
method of distributing property and recommended that on remand the
lower court set aside for the husband that portion of the proceeds from the
wife's separate realty necessary for his support. 5 The approach adopted in
Fitts established an equitable means of providing support without necessitating a divestiture of title to separate property." Subsequent statutory
and judicial authority extended the Fitts precedent by applying the proceeds from separate property of one spouse to the support of minor children. "
In 1969 the Texas Legislature revived the controversy previously settled
in Hailey when it omitted from the new Family Code" the final sentence
of the prior divorce statute which had stated "[nlothing herein shall be
construed to compel either party to divest himself or herself of the title to
real estate."'" It was unclear whether the deletion was inadvertent or
whether the legislature actually intended to change the law.20 While the
express statutory language no longer prohibited divestiture of title to real
property, the constitutionality of such divestiture became an issue.21 In the
1974 decision of Wilkerson v. Wilkerson,22 the Tyler Court of Civil Appeals
interpreted revised section 3.63 as extending the divorce court's authority
13. See Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 453 (1855).
14. Id. at 443.
15. See id. at 453. It may be argued that such an appropriation of proceeds is actually a
form of divestiture of the wife's equitable interest in real estate. Id. at 454.
16. See Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 410, 248 S.W. 21, 23 (1923); Rice v. Rice, 21
Tex. 58, 68 (1858).
17. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 410, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923); Rice v. Rice,
21 Tex. 58, 69 (1858); Helm v. Helm, 291 S.W. 648, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, no
writ); TEX.FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (1975) (the court "may order a parent obligated to
support a child to set aside property to be administered for the support of the child.
18. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
19. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 4638 (1925); accord, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4634 (1911);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2980 (1895); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2864 (1879); Tex. Laws 1841,
An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H. GAMMEL,LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898).
20. The Director of the Family Code Project, Professor Joseph W. McKnight, believes
the omission was an oversight because the amendment was introduced to the legislature as a
"codification of present law." See McKnight, Dissolutionof Marriage, 5 Tx. TECH L. REV.
320, 337 (1974).
21. McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38
(1973). See generally TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
22. 515 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ). Prior to Wilkerson, two civil
appeals cases had failed to distinguish between the old and the new law. See DePuy v. DePuy,
483 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ); Bryant v. Bryant, 478
S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ).
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to allow divestiture of title to a spouse's separate property. 3 The following
year the Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals in Ramirez v. Ramirez4
reached the opposite interpretation of the statute and held that although
5
separate personalty could be divested, separate real property could not."
8
In Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer," the Supreme Court of Texas disapproved
7
of the language in Wilkerson and agreed with the decision in Ramirez.
The majority developed three specific reasons for holding that a spouse's
separate property could not be divested. First, the legislature believed
section 3.63 was merely a "codification of prior law" and that its adoption
would not change the law.2" Second, the Eggemeyer court construed the
state constitution as precluding divestiture by its exclusive definition of
separate property."9 Finally, the court stated that both the federal and
state constitutions prohibit the deprivation of property without a justifiable public purpose.3 " The four dissenting justices contended that section
3.63 removed the statutory prohibition against divestiture of separate
realty and that such divestiture was not a violation of either the state or
31
federal constitutions.
With regard to legislative intent, the majority employed three distinct
arguments to support its position. The court first proposed that the legislature had believed the enactment of section 3.63 to be "a codification of
present law" as expressed by the legislative commentary which had accompanied the original bill.32 This position is weakened by the fact that the
23. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ). In
support of its holding, the court cited three cases decided after the adoption of section 3.63.
Id. at 57. None of the three, however, involved divestiture of separate realty. See Schreiner
v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840, 849 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ dism'd); In re
Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd);
Medearis v. Medearis, 487 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ).
24. 524 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
25. Id. at 771.
26. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
27. Id. at 142.
28. Id. at 139; see McKnight, Dissolution of Marriage, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 320, 337
(1974).
29. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977); see TEx. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 15. The Texas Constitution defines a wife's separate property to include "[aill property,
both real and personal, of the wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that
acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent.... This constitutional definition was held
to be exclusive in Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925). The
definition was originally adopted to protect the property interests of the wife from being lost
to her husband at the time of marriage. See Huie, The Texas ConstitutionalDefinition of
the Wife's Separate Property, 35 TEXAs L. REV. 1054, 1055 (1957).
30. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977); see U.S. CONST.
amends. V; XIV, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
31. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 144-45 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 139; see McKnight, Dissolution of Marriage, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 320, 337
(1974).
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legislature chose not to restore the act to its previous wording when later
considering reinstating the prohibition against divestiture.33 Likewise, the
majority's reliance on section 14.05(a) appears to provide little substantive
evidence of a legislative intention to retain the prior law on property division." This section of the Family Code establishes the means by which a
court may direct a parent to support his child. 5 It does not, however,
pertain to any property rights divisible on divorce. Since children have no
vested interest in either the separate or community property of their parents, they are entitled to nothing more than support from their parents."
The majority in Eggemeyer found additional evidence to support its
interpretation of legislative intent in the wording of section 3.63 that authorizes "a division of the estate of the parties . . . ."I The court construed this language to mean that the community estate, the estate common to both spouses, is the only "estate" which can be subject to division.38
This rationale ignores the numerous pre-Family Code decisions which
reached an opposite conclusion by applying the same phrase to a division
of both the separate personal estate and the community estate.' The only
apparent reason for excluding separate realty in the prior cases was the
express statutory prohibition against the divestiture of separate real property." It may be argued that a more accurate interpretation of the term
"estate" would be obtained by applying that usage adopted by judicial
interpretations of the identical language in the prior statutes.1' Thus, the
fact that this part of the statute remained unaltered in the Family Code
could indicate that the legislature did not intend to limit "estate" to the
community estate, but rather to continue the prior construction.
A major weakness in the majority's attempt to rationalize its position
on the basis of legislative intent is its failure to consider a well-settled rule
of statutory construction which requires the court to give effect to the
legislative modification of a statute. 2 Twenty-five years prior to
33. See TEX. H.R.J. 160 (1973); TEX. H.R.J. 324 (1975).
34. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 144-45 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
But see id. at 139.
35. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (1975).

36. Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 219 n.72 (1975).
37. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975) (emphasis added).
38. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
39. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 407, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923); Goldberg v.
Goldberg, 392 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1965, no writ); Grant v. Grant,
351 S.W.2d 897, 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ dism'd).
40. See Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898).

41. See Gateley v. Humphrey, 151 Tex. 588, 592, 254 S.W.2d 98, 101 (1952).
42. See Putnam Supply Co. v. Chapin, 45 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 9 [2022], No. 2, Art. 9

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

Eggemeyer, the Texas Supreme Court in Gateley v. Humphrey" had reasoned that the omission of significant words from the reenactment of a
statute gives rise to a conclusive presumption that it was the intent of the
legislature to exclude the objective accomplished by the deleted words."
Despite the questionable reliance on legislative intent, the Texas Supreme Court further supported its decision on state and federal constitutional grounds. 5 The court reasoned that divestiture of separate property
would create a class of separate property not encompassed in the state
constitutional definition." The Texas Constitution defines the separate
property of the wife to be all real and personal property owned before the
marriage and that property acquired during marriage by gift, devise or
descent. 7 This definition has been construed as being exclusive and not
subject to enlargement by the legislature.48 Marital property is thus either
separate or community, and the legislature cannot transform one type of
constitutionally defined property into another type of property. 9
The present difficulty in applying a strict interpretation to the constitutional definition of separate property stems from the original distinctions
between separate and community property in divorce proceedings. Prior
to the adoption of the Texas Constitution of 1845, separate property was
defined by statute to include only land and slaves acquired before marriage
or by gift, devise or descent. 0 The community estate consisted of the
remainder of the spouse's property, including what is now considered separate personal property. 5 Under this statutory definition the original divorce statute of 1841 was adopted." When the definition of separate property was enlarged in the constitution of 1845 to include all property, not
just realty and slaves, no similar adjustment was made in the divorce
statute to coincide with the constitution. While the draftsmen of the origi1931), aff'd, 124 Tex. 247, 76 S.W.2d 469 (1934). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b2, §§ 2.01-3.03 (Supp. 1976-1977). The Code Construction Act allows the courts to consider
such guidelines as circumstances under which the statute was enacted and former statutory
provisions, including laws on similar subjects. Id. § 3.03 (2), (4).
43. 151 Tex. 588, 254 S.W.2d 98 (1952).
44. Id. at 592, 254 S.W.2d at 101.
45. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
46. Id. at 140.
47. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. Although the constitution defines only the wife's separate
property, the identical definition has been applied by statute to designate the separate property of the husband. See TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975).
48. Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 540, 273 S.W. 799, 802 (1925).
49. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966).
50. Tex. Laws 1840, An Act to Adopt the Common Law of England § 4, at 4, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 178 (1898).
51. Id. § 4, at 4, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS at 178 (1898).
52. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony §§ 1-14, at 19-22, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898).
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nal divorce statute intended to prohibit divestiture of all separate property, they used the words "real property and slaves" as that was the current definition of separate property."3 After the constitution expanded the
definition the courts applied the statute literally, allowing divestiture of
personalty, and refusing to acknowledge the legislative intent to exclude
all constitutionally defined separate property. 5 As a result of this legislative oversight, divestiture of title to personalty has historically been permitted by the courts without a distinction between the original constitutional and statutory definitions.15 It is therefore inaccurate for the dissent
in Eggemeyer to allude to the long parallel existence of the 1841 statute
and the 1845 constitutional provisions without reference to the fact that
each defined separate property in different terms.
Perhaps the controlling constitutional argument in support of the majority position in Eggemeyer concerns the right to own property free from all
but a minimum of government intervention. 7 To support a denial of divestiture on this constitutional issue the majority relies on authority limiting the power of the state imposed by the due process clause of the state
constitution.5" The due process clause has been held to prohibit the taking
of a person's property for the benefit of another unless there is a justifying
public purpose. The public purpose referred to by this article normally
would relate to limitations on the state's police power 0 or the right of
eminent domain.' In the context of Eggemeyer, however, the controlling
issue concerns substantive protection of property rights as provided by this
section of the Texas Constitution." In cases involving substantive due
53. See id. § 4, at 20, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TExAS at 484 (1898).
54. See McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27,
38 (1973); Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 223-24 (1975).
55. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Tex. 1977) (dissenting opinion).
56. See Comment, Division of MaritalProperty on Divorce:A Proposalto Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 223 (1975).
57. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
58. Id. at 140. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 provides that "[nlo citizen of this State shall be
deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised,
except by the due course of the law of the land." The majority cites Marrs v. Railroad
Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944) to support its contention. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977). The Marrs decision, however, dealt with the use of
the state's police power through an administrative agency to deprive an individual of his
property, not with a court's discretion in dealing with a just and right distribution of marital
property. Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 304, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1944).
59. Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 304, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1944).
60. Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 401, 84 S.W. 648, 653 (1905).
61. See Marrs v. Railroad Comm'n, 142 Tex. 293, 304, 177 S.W.2d 941, 948 (1944).
62. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977).
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process the courts have balanced the interests of the public against those
3
personal and property rights affected by legislative enactments .
A balancing of subjective factors has always served as the foundation for
division of property upon divorce in Texas."4 Prior to Eggemeyer, the Texas
courts had justified the divestiture of personal property on the basis of a
liberal application of the divorce law.65 The constitutional issue was never
raised, perhaps because the state has always recognized a public interest
in fostering a special relationship within the institution of marriage.6 This
interest often outweighed an individual's property rights where the courts
exercised broad discretion in considering numerous individual factors in
the division of property on divorce. 7 One such factor often considered in
property division has been the degree of fault in breaking up the marriage. 6 With the adoption of the Texas Family Code in 1969, however, fault
is no longer necessary as a ground for divorce." Courts nevertheless have
continued to consider fault as a basis for the divestiture of separate personalty and the unequal division of the community estate. 6 It has been questioned whether many of "the old standards associated with fault divorces"
remain "suitable for dealing with division of property in a no-fault
scheme."'" Eggemeyer appears to indicate a shift in emphasis away from
the previously broad discretionary powers of the trial court toward a less
subjective equitable division of property. This approach may eventually
63. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); see Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 126 Tex. 296, 316, 87 S.W.2d 1069, 1070 (1935). See also Interpretive Commentary, TEx.
CONST. art. I, § 19, 1 VERNON'S TEx. CONST., 448 (1955).
64. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 413,
433 (1976).
65. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 407; 248 S.W. 21, 23 (1923); Cooper v.
Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [let Dist.] 1974, no writ); Bryant v.
Bryant, 478 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); Dorfman v. Dorfman,
457 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ).
66. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942). This special relationship,
however, may have diminished once the marriage has been terminated.
67. See Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ)
(liabilities of the spouses); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd) (disparity of earning power between the spouses); Dobbs
v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ) (physical condition of
the parties, probable future need for support, and educational background).
68. See Hooper v. Hooper, 403 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ
dism'd); Hudson v. Hudson, 308 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ);
Faison v. Faison, 31 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, writ dism'd).
69. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 413,
435 (1976).
70. Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432, 43.6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no
writ); Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 234-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no
writ).
71. McKnight, Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
413,
435 (1976).
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result in a division of property similar to a partition by cotenants.
There is further evidence in the opinion that the court has adopted a new
perspective from which to approach property distribution under the Family Code. The failure of the majority to distinguish between separate
personal and real property indicates that Texas may follow the lead of
other community property jurisdictions and prohibit the divestiture of
separate personalty as well as real property." Although the facts in
Eggemeyer raise no issue of divestiture of personalty and the decision is
limited to the facts involved, all of the reasons propounded by the majority
can be argued convincingly in favor of a similar prohibition against the
divestiture of separate personal property. Thus Eggemeyer may signal the
quietus of the court's broad discretion to order any just distribution of
property on divorce.
The implications that Eggemeyer might have on future marital property
division may well extend beyond separate property interests. A modernization of Texas divorce law might eliminate many of the complications that
have resulted from years of circumventing prior divorce statutes.73 At the
same time such a change may bring the state closer to applying the principles of the ganacial system of marital property upon which Texas community property laws are founded.74 Under this system both spouses are
considered equal and consequently the benefits of the marriage are divided
evenly on divorce of the partners.7 5
It has been cogently argued that the discretionary division of property
in Texas might be replaced by a system of equal division as currently
allowed in California and Louisiana." Such a development, however, may
require the Texas courts to reexamine many of the basic community property standards in existence today. It is conceivable that the long-standing
opposition to permanent alimony may be dropped in an effort to balance
any inequities that might occur with an equal distribution of property.
The uncertainty resulting from the deletion of the prohibition against
divestiture in the Family Code appears only partly resolved by Eggemeyer.
There is no doubt that the ownership of separate real property cannot be
72. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West 1976); CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4800
(Deering Supp. 1977); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2406 (West 1971).
73. See, e.g., Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 410, 248 S.W. 21, 22-23 (1923) (award of

determinable fee in separate estate of spouse); Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 453 (1855) (allowing

for setting aside of proceeds from separate real property); Helm v. Helm, 291 S.W. 648, 649

(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1927, no writ) (providing for child support by encumbering prop-

erty).

74. See generally Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to
Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 210 (1975).
75. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19
BAYLOR L. REv. 20, 26 (1967).
76. Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section

3.63, 7 ST.

MARY's

L.J. 209, 224 (1975).
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